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Abstract: The World Social Forum (WSF) has provided an international stage for civil society from across 
the globe to share ideas, strategies, tactics and struggles for creating ‘another world’ against the failures 
of market inequalities. It attracts more than sixty thousand people pursuing the vision of 'Another World 
is Possible', with the event becoming a symbol of hope for environmental, social and economic justice. 
How effective has the WSF been in projecting the concerns of the grassroots against inequalities 
produced? Should new strategies and tactics be forged amongst civil society so that this international 
platform becomes more meaningful for the marginalised? Through empirical work conducted at the 2011 
WSF in Dakar, Senegal, supplemented with previous empirical work with civil society conducted in 
Durban, South Africa, this paper points to challenges that need to be addressed by civil society if ‘another 
world is possible.’ Although there is an urgent need for local representative and civil society to mobilise 
social capital and include the grassroots into discussions in future WSF gatherings, the success of such an 
international platform is also influenced by historical, socio-economic and political contexts within 
countries influencing social capital within networks. Grassroots empowerment will help build more 
coherent actions that reflect the needs of those most affected by inequalities 
 




There is widespread evidence that neoliberal policies have contributed to growing inequalities with 
worsening living conditions for the majority of the world’s people (Lazzarato, 2009). Some reasons for 
inequality include placing public wealth into private hands, approving tax cuts for the wealthy, and 
pushing wages down for the non-elite, to name a few (Smith, 2012). Pick & Dayaram (2006) demonstrate 
that neoliberal development in India is characterised by ambiguity, contradiction and paradox - 
increasing inequality. Similarly, South Africa’s democratic transition saw national liberation achieved 
when neo-liberal ideology was globally dominant (Fig, 2005) with poverty and inequality continuing to 
exhibit strong spatial and racial biases (United Nations South African Human Development Report, 2003). 
This has sustained disproportionately black people subjected to social and environmental injustices 
(Sparks, 2006). For example, the burdens of economic policy and planning and resultant environmental 
pollution in South Durban, an industrial hub in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa have fallen on local 
communities paying the price of regional and national wealth generation (Fig, 2005; Ballard et al. 2005). 
Communities are exposed varyingly to pollution across class and race lines (Barnett & Scott, 2007), with 
communities speaking out against environmental injustices (Leonard & Pelling, 2010). The South Durban 
Community Environmental Alliance (SDCEA), a community based organisation in South Durban had been 
set up by residents to fight pollution in the area. Unfortunately, in line with its neoliberal agenda, the area 
has been highlighted by the African National Congress (ANC) as a Spatial Development Zone (SDZ) for 
continuing industrial expansion with substantial economic potential (Scott, 2003). While many sites 
around South Africa like South Durban witness communities exposed to environmental injustices to 
various degrees due to distributional inequalities, the richest 20% of South Africans earn just short of 
sixty-five per cent of national income (Hallowes & Butler, 2004). With such disparities in class structures 
and inequality, alternative visions of development that benefit the majority and take their concerns into 
account are required.  
 
From its onset in 2001, the WSF has been upheld as an international umbrella representing grassroots 
people’s organizations, committed to reversing the tide of the dominant neoliberal economic agenda 
(Chossudovsky, 2013). However, despite this vision of the WSF, levels of inequality are ever increasing 
(Hyatt, 2013). Against global flows of wealth and increasing inequality, the WSF attracts more than sixty 
thousand people pursuing the vision of 'Another World is Possible', with the event becoming a symbol of 
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hope for environmental, social and economic justice. The WSF was first organised in Porto Allegro, Brazil, 
in 2001, and provides a space for social and environmental activists globally to share ideas, strategies and 
tactics for creating another better world against the failures of neoliberalism. However, how effective has 
the WSF been as an international platform to support grassroots struggles against market inequalities, 
which continues to impact on marginalised citizens? Although the impressive diversity of the WSF is 
frequently praised, there has been little investigative work done on the degree to which the praxis of the 
WSF is enabling communicability across previously unbridged difference and how relations of power play 
out in this international arena (Conway, 2011).   
 
Many observers of previous WSFs have observed a continued trend of lack of grassroots representation 
and domination of the forum by middle-class activists. Cock (2004) refers to the WSF striving for political 
action, and which advocates for participatory democracy and the rejection of leaders and hierarchies, yet 
it is dominated by ‘big men’ who are white and middle aged. According to Cock, few Africans, Asians, 
Arabs or Afro-Brazilians have been present at WSF gatherings. Wilson (2007) notes that the integration 
of feminism into the WSF has always remained uneven. Taylor and Naidoo (2004) note, the 2004 WSF 
had less than one per cent African representation. There has been a growing dominance of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) over people's movements and local grassroots participation. The 
2013 WSF was also said to be dominated by big NGOs and local leaderships over the grassroots directly 
affected by environmental injustices (Hyatt, 2013). Many of the social movement leaders (e.g. anti-war 
coalitions, environmentalists and the anti-globalization movement) were said to have betrayed their 
grassroots constituencies. Additionally, since events are self-organised, this compartmentalized structure 
has been one of the obstacles to the development of a meaningful and articulate mass movement 
(Chossudovsky, 2013). This questions whether a space is provided for grassroots to shape alternatives to 
globalisation from above, and whether coherence is actually growing within the WSF movement and from 
the local to the global levels to inform WSF debates on strategies and tactics against inequality. Should 
new strategies and tactics be forged amongst civil society so that this international platform becomes 
more meaningful? This paper presents observations and empirical work from interviews conducted with 
key civil society activists during the 2011 WSF, held in Dakar Senegal, supplemented by empirical work 
with civil society in Durban, South Africa in 2007. It attempts to access some of the challenges posed by 
such international events, including at the local Durban level for civil society in advancing the needs of the 
marginalised and to connect with such international platforms. Results are presented before engaging in 
discussion and conclusion.   
 
2. The network society, sub-politics and social capital 
 
Theories of network society, sub-politics and social capital are used to frame this analysis of the relational 
spaces shaping collective actions for environmental justice at WSF events. According to Castells (2000), 
the network society is the social structure made of nodes composed of individuals, organizations, or 
movements. These nodes may be united due to certain characteristics (e.g. values, ideas, visions). In the 
network society, policies and decisions are shaped not only by government but also by other interest 
groups who are ‘in the network’ (e.g. communities, social movements, industry). There are also 
inequalities within the network society (as highlighted above) due to market disparities. This paper is 
interested in the extent to which civil society actors have been able to organise themselves (and 
grassroots actors) to have influence in this network society via the WSF. However, the most fundamental 
mechanism of domination by government and industry within the network society is the exclusion of 
grassroots from fully integrating into decision-making networks, with power operating by exclusion and 
inclusion. For example, Hallowes & Butler (2005) refer to industrial processes in South Africa (and Africa 
generally) as being institutions of the market. They note that these institutions are also designed to 
remove decision-making power from civil society (and government) and exclude people from wealth 
while the grassroots carry the externalised costs of production (i.e. industrial risks) through 
contamination of the environment and health effects. 
 
The WSF as a sub-political sphere provides a space for civil society and especially the grassroots to have 
potential influence in the network society against inequalities and domination. Sub-politics refer to 
politics outside and beyond the representative institutions of the political system of the nation-state. It is 
individual participation in political decisions, bypassing the institutions of representative opinion 
formation (i.e. governments, political parties, parliaments) (Beck, 1999). Communities, NGOs and 
environmental campaigners act as a new force in society against domination (Matten, 2004). These 
groups gain political momentum and broad support with a network society from the visible gap between 
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the demands of the citizenry and their representation in the spectrum of political parties (Beck, 1992). 
Sub-politics appear to offer people structures of political action against market forces, which have diluted 
state controls. Beck proposes a need for a whole range of new institutions, strategies and actors (i.e. 
citizen’s initiative groups and social movements) against inequalities produced. 
 
Social capital can assist in understanding the WSF as a space for environmental justice for the creation of 
sub-politics in a network society to challenge inequalities produced by the market, including for the 
emergence of alternative development frameworks. While it is acknowledged that there is ambiguity 
regarding the definitional aspects and types of social capital (see Radcliffe 2004, Mohan & Mohan 2002), 
the aim is not to cover this literature extensively but rather examine the various social capital 
relationships to explore the WSF as a space for environmental justice. Social capital is interpreted as a 
determinant of social relations and networks building on cultural norms (Trigilia, 2001), and in this way 
as a feature of social life-networks, norms and trust that enable participants to act together more 
effectively and potentially more inclusively, to pursue a common agenda (Wakefield et al., 2005). Social 
capital is also a product of repeated social interactions between individuals and groups over time 
developing experience, personal trust, social norms, and can lead to strengthened co-operation and 
reciprocity (Power & Willmot, 2007, Lee et al., 2005), which can assist communities in reaching mutual 
goals in responding to crises (Farquhar et al., 2005). Through these repeated interactions between 
individuals and groups over time, social capital can accrue as societal social capital (i.e. supporting 
collective action for collective gain) or as an individual good (social capital used to further the interests of 
individuals at the expense of wider society) (Stolle & Hooghe, 2003). It is also recognised that social 
capital can be exclusive leading to differentiated groups in society and fostering conflict and inequality as 
well as cooperation. Portes (1998) also refers to the negative consequences of bridging social capital, 
which leads to the exclusion of certain groups. As Fine (2003) notes, the effects of social capital are just as 
liable to be negative as positive. Since social capital encompasses a wide range of social phenomena, it can 
be selective in practice subjecting it to weaknesses. 
 
Weak bonding ties in a community and amongst social networks are more conducive for broader 
mobilisation and large-scale protest action than strong bonding ties. Weak bonding ties are more likely to 
link members of different groups than strong bonding ties, which tend to be concentrated in particular 
groups, and which restrict social networking and curb popular mobilisation. It is through the trust and 
reciprocity of social relations that social capital between individuals is maintained, mobilised and utilised 
(i.e. for protest action) (Lee et al., 2005). Limited results in addressing problems will occur if only a few 
individuals engage in mobilisation and protests. However, if through dialogue a consensus is reached 
amongst a critical mass of people who take action together, then long-term solutions are possible 
(Figueroa et al., 2002). The examination of the WSF as a sub-political form of networking to attain 
environmental justice through the social capital lens involves a unique set of relationships for analysis 




Interviews was conducted with key civil society activists during the 2011 WSF, held in Dakar Senegal, 
supplemented by empirical work with civil society in Durban, South Africa in 2007. Semi-structured 
interviews were used to collect data from social actors (i.e. CBOs, community leaders, NGOs, academics, 
international civil society actors). Data analysis employed grounded theory and open coding to identify 
themes. This paper focuses generally on findings and across themes.  
 
4. Results  
 
Middle-class activists had more hold on the direction of the 2011 WSF without including the attendance 
and concerns of those most affected to increase social capital within a network society. Middle-class 
activists therefore did not necessarily engage in societal social capital for the WSF to have influence in a 
network society. Siziwe Khanyile (personal communication, 2011), Air Quality Co-ordinator of 
groundwork, South Africa noted, with reference to the climate change discussions:  
 
"Africa is one of the worst affected by climate change...I don't know how many [local] people [are] part of the 
discussions. It would be nice to have a stronger African presence... It is more of the people you work with; 




The above indirectly suggests that donors (e.g. national government, United Nations, northern NGOs) 
have been biased in favour of NGOs (and CBO leaders) imagining that they are representative of the 
grassroots. Unfortunately NGOs did not engage in wider social capital for the WSF to have influence in the 
network society. In addition to class and representative imbalances at WSFs, there are clearly also gender 
imbalances which limited social capital. For example at the 2011 WSF, many of the Southern NGOs and 
representatives, most funded by Western donors (as above), were mainly men, with a limited attendance 
by women leaderships, particularly those women who are normally at the frontline of social and 
environmental injustices at the household level. Unfortunately strategic leaderships building momentum 
at the grassroots was lacking in countries to bring those affected to WSF platforms. This also questions 
whether the WSF as an international platform assists in uniting social movements across the globe 
struggling against the forces of neoliberalism, while seeking a world order based on justice. Desmond 
D'Sa, leader of the SDCEA in South Durban highlighted the urgent need to mobilise grassroots within 
nations and communities if local voices are to shape WSF events: 
 
"...I haven't seen ordinary people active in most of the [WSF] stuff...it also starts in home countries where civil 
society is fragmented and because of the fragmentation, it leads to individuals taking the lead...they are 
accountable to nobody...people [grassroots] taking the lead and being active in the [WSF] process...does not 
happen...more women need to be at the forefront...in the leadership..." 
 
However, corporate funding of some environmental justice community organisations at the local level 
also hindered collective engagement with other local organisations and with the grassroots for collective 
engagement. This indirectly influenced social capital at the WSF for more coherent actions. For example, 
within South Durban, dispute remains between some CBOs accepting corporate funding and the local 
SDCEA CBO which does not. For example, corporate funding from industry by the local Merebank 
Residents Association (MRA) CBO put strain on the relationship between itself and the SDCEA and 
grassroots to collectively address local concerns. Farhida Khan (personal communication, 2007), 
Administrator and Air quality assistant, SDCEA noted:  
 
‘SDCEA and community members have seen MRA accepting money from Mondi, from SAPREF, from Engen. 
Because of that, it has hindered the relationship [between] MRA and SDCEA.’  
 
However, the lack of grassroots participation at WSF events was more complex than suggested above; 
fragmentation at the local level in South Africa was partly due to leadership ineffectiveness due to the 
transition to democracy when most civil society leaders moved into government causing a vacuum in 
effective civil society leadership. As a result new leaders due to lack of experience were unable to engage 
in grassroots mobilisation. This has also indirectly influenced grassroots engagement at WSF gatherings. 
According to Brij Maharaj (Interview, 2007) Head: Department of Geography, University of KwaZulu-
Natal, noting for demobilisation of civil society leadership during the transition, 
 
“…The state was worried about the high level of mobilisation by civil society up to 1994. The new ANC 
government was well aware that they could not deliver…there were heightened expectations, so it 
demobilised civil society…The leaders of civil society got co-opted into government structures at different 
levels” 
 
The extraction of effective leadership’s from civil society organisations and moving to government 
structures, disintegrated leadership’s mobilisation of the grassroots for collective actions against 
environmental injustices. As a former employee, Bobby Peek (Interview, 2007), director of environmental 
justice NGO groundwork noted, referring to the Environmental Justice Networking Forum (EJNF), a 
nationwide umbrella organisation formulated in 1992 before the democratic transition to bridge the 
social, economic, environmental and political issues to reverse and prevent environmental injustices 
affecting the poor:  
 
“EJNF…started in a pre-democratic…active process in the early 90’s were a lot of those that are in 
government now and…big business…were in civil society…These people…started these very good 
organisations and then left, and as generations went and came…the leadership…started suffering…you were 
getting less articulate, less visionary people involved…What was important for them [new leaders] was no 




Besides leadership ineffectiveness, fragmentation at the local level was also due to socio-economic issues 
of poverty to engage in social and environmental justice concerns for wider social capital relations. A 
failure by the South African government to deliver basic needs weakened grassroots engagement on ways 
to tackle inequalities due to neoliberalism and alternative development paths. As Brij Maharaj (Interview, 
2007) noted: 
 
“A lot of people are engaged in basic survival. I don’t think they have the time or the resources to actually 
engage in these things [debates and actions on inequalities in society]…” 
 
However, the poor socio-economic status of the grassroots was used by neoliberal market forces (i.e. 
multinational corporations), which the WSF works against, to strategically divide local community 
groups. This indirectly has had an influence on grassroots representation and projecting of local concerns 
at WSF events. The tactic of corporations dividing the grassroots was noted by Farhida Khan for South 
Durban (personal communication, 2007): 
 
“…they [industry] will call an organization that they know is financially burdened, and say to them we’ll give 
you ten thousand rand to do a survey for us, but just remember SDCEA is bad mouthing us…so the hypocrisy 
of that just doesn’t gel well…” 
 
Besides fragmentation of civil society actors at the national and local level in South Africa, and neoliberal 
forces (i.e. corporations) role within this, fragmentation between civil society actors did exist at the 2011 
WSF between environmental organisations. This was more so between some big international NGOs and 
the smaller environmental groups. Some international NGOs had divergent ideologies from activists and 
community organisations engaging in discussions to strategize against the destructive effects of 
globalisation and climate change. As Phil Thornhill, who works on climate change and is the National Co-
ordinator of the Campaign Against Violent Change in the United Kingdom noted: 
 
"...the green movement is divided...[although] more people have gotten interested in climate change and 
become active...[however], people bring in a lot of political agendas, and sometimes these political agendas 
tend to dominate...there is also a role for a kind of big tent bringing all kinds of people together...[but] the big 
NGOs bring their brands...and they want to dominate the agenda..." 
 
The above statement suggests that even if civil society in South Africa (as one example) were to 
effectively coordinate local grassroots mobilisation and input into international platforms such as the 
WSF for increased social capital, there would be no guarantee that such local voices would be heard, since 
domination of bigger international NGOs may be at play to silence local voices and hence local social 
capital. This may suggest a need for a more co-ordinated bottom-up approach within countries (and 
between grassroots movements) to influence WSF events. Nevertheless, besides issues of class and 
gender imbalances, lack of grassroots presence, individualised leadership, corporate influence of 
grassroots, divergent ideologies and domination between some groupings, the forum's strength is in 
bringing together activists and groupings from across the globe to potentially engage in common 
struggles for social and environmental justice and increase social capital that would not have otherwise 
occurred. Thus, activists are potentially able to make connections between the different struggles 
globally, hinting at how the WSF event has advanced since its inception at Davos from just criticising 
market forces. Since its inception discussions at the WSF have expended and centred around 
international migration, the exploitation of land and natural resources, and land grabbing and biofuels to 
name a few (evident at the 2011 WSF), showing the WSFs role of providing potential solidarity. According 
to Siziwe Khanyile (personal communication, 2011) from groundwork:  
 
"The WSF, in spite of whatever the problems are, is also a place to let the world know what we are 
planning…and how we can link with them and develop positions...we are calling for a move away from fossil 





There is an urgent need for civil society organisations to reconsider how the WSF is supposedly used as a 
space for empowering the marginalised that bear the most impact due to market inequalities. While WSF 
events do provide an ideal international platform to connect with activists within a global network to 
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increase social capital, delegates (especially civil society leaders of the global South) would achieve more 
by mobilising and including the grassroots into discussions in future WSF events. Thus, weak bonding ties 
would also be effective in bringing in the voices of the marginalised as opposed to middleclass activists. 
Such actions will help build a more progressive civil society that can provide solutions that reflect the 
needs of the grassroots most impacted by inequalities in society. However, it is important for local 
communities to mobilise collectively against neoliberal market forces which strategically divide local 
groups by offering funding to financially burdened organisations. This indirectly has influenced 
grassroots representation and projecting of local concerns at WSF events. It is acknowledge that local 
community groups do require funding to engage in social upliftment projects, how funds should be 
channelled to a central community fund and administered accordingly with appropriate checks and 
balances on how funding is used. This will assist in resolving some of the fragmentation caused by 
multinationals and local groups within the network society. Nevertheless, future WSF events will have to 
be sensitive to class and gender imbalances with more representative leaderships if 'another world' is to 
be achieved. The aim must be to move from the 'possible' to 'another world is here', but this transition 
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